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FOREWORD
This symposium is an attempt to explore certain aspects of what is commonly
called a close corporation. At the very outset difficulty arises in determining what
is meant by this term. For example, the close corporation is usually identified with
small business, and undoubtedly most such organizations are small businesses, but
there have been and still are many notable exceptions in this country.
Another fact emphasized in attempting to define the close corporation, is that
irrespective of the size of the business the stock of the corporation is closely held,
that is, it is owned and controlled by a small number of individuals, frequently all
members of one family group, and sometimes even by a sole shareholder. Such
close ownership of the stock has certain important consequences. Obviously the
stock will not be listed on any public exchange. Furthermore, it will not even be
handled on over-the-counter markets because transfers or sales of it inevitably will be
highly infrequent and usually within the family or other controlling group. To
maintain and enforce this ownership usually there will be restrictions on the sale or
transfer of the shares, based upon provisions in the certificate of incorporation, the
by-laws, or stockholder agreements and options. From this standpoint, not only is
stock closely held but also ownership of it is closed to those outside the favored or
family group.
Another typical characteristic of the close corporation is that, unlike the publicly
owned one, its ownership, control, and management are centralized and unified in
one group, namely the shareholders. There usually is no division between the
shareholder-owners and the director-managers. Either the stockholders themselves
are the directors, or they so closely dominate and control the directors that the latter
are in fact little more than their agents. Frequently the shareholders go even further,
and besides being directors are also the officers and executives of the company. In
any event, either through serving as the directors and officers themselves or through
detailed provisions in the charter, by-laws, or stockholder agreements, the share-
holders personally manage and control the business directly or else perform these
functions through others who in fact simply act as their agents.
This emphasis upon closing the doors of a company to outsiders so far as stock
ownership is concerned, and upon the direct, almost day to day management of the
business by the shareholders, resembles a partnership rather than the common law
concept of a corporation. Yet, at the same time, the shareholders of the close corpora-
tion highly prize the corporate privilege of limited liability, and to an almost sur-
prising degree they have achieved this goal, even in the case of the one man corpora-
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don, despite some rather vague limitations on limited liability here not yet fully
developed.
When, as often happens, the close corporation is not a one man or one family
business but is owned or controlled by two or three individuals or family groups,
problems are multiplied and more complicated. Restrictions on the transferability of
the shares, the allocation of voting rights, provisions for dividends, assignments of
directorships and oflicerships in the business-all must be carefully planned and
worked out beforehand, and thereafter these must be so fixed that they cannot be
changed to the detriment of any shareholder without his consent. Failure to give
each shareholder such a veto power may well result in the well-known squeeze play
or freeze out of one or more minority dissenting shareholders. Since the courts thus
far have generally shown little imagination or ingenuity in protecting minority in-
terests in this situation, the burden falls upon shareholders and their counsel to
work out adequate protective provisions. Whether the Securities and Exchange Act
may offer greater relief than the courts formerly have, is still uncertain.
On the other hand, preservation of the status quo through giving each shareholder
a veto power, so that changes may not be made unless all the shareholders consent,
may result in a complete deadlock so that action cannot be taken. In the event of such
a corporate paralysis dissolution may be as necessary as if a partnership were involved.
Yet all too frequently there is no statutory or judicial relief available. Here again,
it is the responsibility of counsel to make certain that the corporate documents pro-
vide adequate machinery so far as possible for handling such deadlocks through
provisions either for arbitration or for dissolution of the corporation.
One of the most striking facts about the close corporation is the extent to which
it is the creation of business men and their counsel rather than of the courts or the
legislatures. Most corporate legislation is admittedly drafted for the publicly owned
company, at least in this country. Unlike Great Britain and Continental Europe,
we have made little attempt in our corporate statutes to provide for the problems
and the needs of the close corporation. Our tax laws, for example, treat practically
all corporations alike, with only a few special provisions attempting to cope with the
unique tax problems presented by the close corporation. The courts, by and large,
have shown little more creative ability than the legislatures in this area, and only
infrequently appear to appreciate the position of the close corporation. The result
is that business men and their counsel, whose legitimate needs find expression and
satisfaction in the close corporation, are often compelled to operate in clouds of
legal doubts and uncertainties and with realities masked by corporate fictions necessi-
tated by awkward legislation and judicial decisions. Consequently, although the
close corporation is generally a smaller enterprise than its publicly owned counter-
part, its corporate structure and papers as reflected, for example, in charter, by-laws,
voting trusts, or stockholder agreements, are frequently far more complex and
verbose. Perhaps the time is approaching when our corporate laws should be revised
to correspond more closely with the needs and realities of the close corporation.
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